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cal information about the effects of different social positions and the expectations of the people who occupy them.
We do know that people in high-status positions
behave differently than people in low-status positions.
People in high-status positions speak more often and
interrupt others more than do people in low-status positions (Bales & Slater, 1955; Bavelas, Hastorf, Gross, &
Kite, 1965; Ng, Bell, & Brooke, 1993). They have different gaze patterns (Ellyson, Dovidio, & Fehr, 1981;
Exline, Ellyson, & Long, 1975) and different facial
expressions (Dixson, 1977; Harper, 1985; Keating,
1985). These behaviors probably reflect both consequences of high and low status and peoples expectations about social status positions. That is, social status
may in itself create behavioral differences but there also
may be expectations about how people in high- and lowstatus positions should behave.
Behavioral differences between low- and high-status
people, such as talking and interrupting, can be easily
observed, remembered, and imitated; therefore, they
are also easy to manipulate. Those who want to live up to

Three vignette studies examined stereotypes of the emotions asso
ciated with high and low status group members. In Study 1a,
participants believed that in negative situations, high status
people feel more angry than sad or guilty and that low status
people feel more sad and guilty than angry. Study 1b showed
that in response to positive outcomes, high status people are
expected to feel more pride and low status people are expected to
feel more appreciation. Study 2 showed that people also infer
status from emotions: Angry and proud people are thought of as
high status, whereas sad, guilty, and appreciative people are
considered low status. The authors argue that these emotion
stereotypes are due to differences in the inferred abilities of people
in high and low positions. These perceptions lead to expectations
about agency appraisals and emotions related to agency apprais
als. In Study 3, the authors found support for this process by
manipulating perceptions of skill and finding the same differ
ences in emotion expectations.

S
ocial hierarchy is one of the most frequently occurring forms of social organization. Hierarchies exist in so

many kinds of groups in almost all cultures that people
are probably rarely free from the influence of social
status positions (Brown, 1985; Lonner, 1980; Mazur,
1973). These status positions and their influences are of
extreme importance to many people who spend a great
deal of time and energy trying to fulfill the expectations
of their hierarchical position, to move up to higher positions, and to avoid being demoted to lower positions
(Jones & Pittman, 1982; King, 1995; Winter, 1973).
Although concerns about social expectations related
to status pervade peoples everyday lives, psychologists,
for the most part, have ignored the omnipresence of
social hierarchy. Consequently, there is very little empiri-
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the expectations for their position can learn to produce
these behavioral patterns. Less visible correlates of social
status position may be less easy to learn but may be just as
important for social mobility. Expected differences in
the underlying psychological processes of low- and highstatus people may be less perceptible but confirmation
or disconfirmation of these expectations may be quite
powerful because people believe that psychological
processing is especially diagnostic. If people in highstatus positions are assumed to think and feel one way,
whereas those in low-status positions are assumed to
think and feel another way, then the expression of
thoughts and feelings could influence perceptions of
rightful status. And, because psychological processes are
less easily imitated and manipulated than overt behavior,
they may produce even stronger inferences about a persons actual status.
In this article, we examine expectations about the
characteristic emotions of people in high- and low-status
positions. In addition, we investigate a possible cognitive
process underlying these expectations.
There is even less research about the psychological
differences between high- and low-status group members than there is about their behavioral differences.
However, the research on behavioral differences
between low- and high-status group members provides
some clues as to possible psychological differences. In
particular, some of the behavioral findings can be interpreted to suggest that there may be emotional differences between low- and high-status group members. For
example, the facial expressions that have been associated with social status (Keating, 1985) also have been
shown to be related to emotions (Ekman, 1979, 1993;
Ekman & Friesen, 1971). The furrowed eyebrows and
stiff lips of high-status group members are components
of the facial expression of anger, and the tendency of
those in lower positions to smile while averting their gaze
is similar to the expression sequence Keltner (1995)
found for embarrassment. In addition, certain behaviors
linked to status in nonhuman primates, such as withdrawal, turning away, teeth gnashing, and hitting
(Mitchell & Maple, 1985), correspond to action tendencies associated with various emotions (Frijda, Kuipers, &
ter Schure, 1989). Again, the high-status behavior of
teeth gnashing and hitting are behaviors that appear
with anger, whereas the low-status behaviors of turning
away and withdrawal occur with guilt, embarrassment,
fear, and sadness. Furthermore, dominance behaviors
such as pointing and interrupting betoken feelings of
confidence and pride, whereas the slouched protective
stance of low-status individuals suggests feelings of vulnerability and insecurity (Carli, LaFleur, & Loeber, 1995;
Ridgeway, 1987; Yukl & Falbe, 1990). As parallels such as
these mount, more and more researchers are beginning
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to suggest that emotions and social status may indeed be
related (Clark, 1990; Kemper, 1991; Ridgeway & Johnson, 1990); preliminary investigations of emotional differences between people at different status levels suggest
that there are differences in the emotions they actually
experience (Conway & Pizzamiglio, 1996; Keltner,
Young, Heerey, Oemig, & Monarch, 1998; Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Moskowitz, 1998).
These physical cues might also suggest to lay people
that there are systematic differences in the emotions of
low- and high-status group members. They may come to
hold stereotypes about the inner experiences of group
members. These stereotypes would lead people to
expect certain emotional states based on status and
could allow people to make inferences about the status
level of individuals based on information about their
emotional states. Certainly, such stereotypes, expectations, and inferences exist for gender, a characteristic
often associated with status (Berger, Fisek, Norman, &
Zelditch, 1977; Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980;
Ridgeway & Diekema, 1989). People expect women to
feel more sad than men, whereas they expect men to feel
more angry than women (Birnbaum, 1983; Birnbaum &
Croll, 1984; Fabes & Martin, 1991). In addition, people
rate both male and female targets with angry expressions
as more masculine than targets expressing other emotions (Algoe, Buswell, & DeLamater, 1998). Although
these literatures can be interpreted as suggesting that
people have stereotypes about status-related emotions,
none of this research has directly tested that question or
provide much theorizing about why people might hold
these expectations or why there are differences in the
emotional experiences of low- and high-status group
members.
In our research, we have been arguing that the emotional differences between people at different social levels occur because people believe that status indicates
ability, and we argue that this belief influences attributions of responsibility for positive and negative events.
According to appraisal theories of emotions, differences
in causal attributions or appraisals result in different
emotions. Tiedens et al. (1998) demonstrated that people in high-status positions are likely to feel anger in
response to negative outcomes, whereas people in lowstatus positions are likely to feel sadness and guilt. If the
outcome is positive, then high-status people tend to feel
pride, whereas low-status people feel appreciation. This
pattern was uncovered both when status was randomly
assigned in a laboratory situation and when peoples
emotional ratings of social situations at work were examined. In the research presented here, our aim was to find
out whether people have implicit knowledge of this
process. We examined whether people have expectations about the causal appraisals and emotions of people
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in low- and high-status positions. We predicted that (a)
high-status people are expected to feel more angry and
proud, whereas low-status people are expected to feel
more guilty, sad, and appreciative; (b) angry and proud
people are considered high status, whereas sad, guilty,
and appreciative people are thought to be low status; and
(c) similar patterns can be created by any information
about differences in the skills and abilities. When a person is considered highly competent, they will be
expected to be angry and proud, whereas a person who is
considered to lack necessary skills and abilities will be
expected to be sad, guilty, and appreciative. These patterns are important not only because they illuminate
some of the challenges faced by people trying to live up
to the expectations of their role but also because they
indicate that stereotypes, which are usually considered
to consist of perceptions of simple traits and behaviors,
can also include assumptions about complex psychological processes.
Expectations of Skill and Expectations About Emotions
Research on social status consistently suggests that
people hold trait-like stereotypes of people in low- and
high-status positions. People tend to believe that highstatus people are more competent, intelligent, and even
better looking than are low-status people (Darley &
Gross, 1983; Georgesen & Harris, 1998; Humphrey,
1985; Lambert, Hodgson, Gardner, & Fillenbaum, 1960;
Ng, 1980; Ridgeway, 1987; Rossell et al., 1997; Sande,
Ellard, & Ross, 1986). A recent meta-analysis has shown
that this evaluative effect is quite robust, occurring in a
wide variety of contexts using numerous status manipulations and various evaluative measures (Georgesen &
Harris, 1998). In short, high-status people are considered better. Amazingly, these attributions occur even
when the participants understand that status was randomly assigned (e.g., Humphrey, 1985) and when the
participants do not interact after being assigned to their
status roles (Sande et al., 1986).
These stereotypes about ability may create other,
more complex, expectations, such as expectations about
causal attributions and emotions. Specifically, people
may use status and the information status conveys about
skill to assist them in deciding who is responsible for
events. If status affects causal attributions, it could also
affect emotions. Appraisal theories of emotion have
demonstrated that peoples interpretations of events
correspond to particular emotion states (Frijda, 1986;
Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth,
1985). According to appraisal theories, different people
can have different emotional reactions to the same event
because they interpret the situation differently.
Appraisal theorists have shown that to understand which
specific emotion a person feels in response to a situation,

we need to know how he or she interprets the situation
along the appraisal dimensions relevant to emotions.
The attribution of agency, or causality, is a dimension of
interpretation central to most appraisal theories of emotion (also see Wiener, 1985). Smith and Ellsworth (1985)
found three major types of agency appraisal: (a) I am
responsible, (b) someone else is responsible, and (c)
no one is responsible. In their work, this agency
appraisal distinguished among the negative emotions of
anger, sadness, and guilt (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a).
Negative events seen as caused by oneself evoke guilt,
negative events seen as caused by circumstances (i.e., no
one) evoke sorrow, and negative events seen as caused by
other people evoke anger. Similarly, agency appraisals
discriminate between positive emotions (Ellsworth &
Smith, 1988b). Pride is associated with feeling personal
responsibility for a positive outcome, and appreciation
or admiration is evoked when someone else is considered responsible.
Appraisal theorists argue that these appraisals are
essential components of emotions, yet at the same time,
it is recognized that they are not the most readily accessible aspect of emotions (van Reekum & Scherer, 1997).
Neither an observer nor the person experiencing the
emotion necessarily has immediate access to the appraisals. They are not central to the intuitive psychologists
theory of emotions, perhaps, in part, because they are
unobservable. However, once people spend time reflecting on what they were thinking while experiencing an
emotion, they systematically and reliably report an association between these appraisals and emotions.
Appraisals are not the only phenomenological component of emotions. Another more easily observed
aspect of emotions is called action tendencies. Frijda
(Frijda, 1986; Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989) has
argued that specific emotions can be distinguished by
the extent to which they make a person feel like engaging in different behaviors. He has found that various
phrases describing behavioral intentions map onto specific emotions (especially negative emotions) and to the
appraisals associated with those emotions. For example,
Frijda et al. (1989) found that the phrase feels like Im
boiling inwardly describes the experience of anger and
of blaming someone else for a negative event. Boiling
inwardly does not, however, describe the experience of
people feeling guilty and blaming themselves for a negative event. Instead, the experience of guilt and of blaming oneself for a negative event is best captured by the
phrase wishing to disappear from view.
At least for negative emotions, then, action tendencies provide another way to measure emotional experience or, in this case, expectations of emotional experience. Action tendencies are particularly interesting
measures for questions about the expectations of emo-
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tional experience because they are psychological in that
they describe an experience or a feeling, not a behavior;
yet, of all the phenomenological components of emotion, they may be the most closely related to observable
behavioral outcomes of emotions. From an evolutionary
perspective, then, they may be the most important component of emotions to recognize. So, for outsiders,
action tendencies might be the most easily inferred component of emotion; thus, action tendencies might be the
aspect of emotion for which there are the strongest
expectations. Indeed, Frijda (Frijda et al., 1989; Frijda,
Markam, Sato, & Wiers, 1995) has found that allowing
participants to report on action tendencies adds considerably to the variance in emotions explained by
appraisals.
In some situations, it is clear who or what is responsible for an outcome; however, in many situations, people
may need to look for additional cues to infer responsibility. Status may be one cue that is used to determine
agency. For example, if a group accomplishes a goal, the
positive perceptions of high-status members may lead
people to infer that a high-status member was probably
responsible. Because low-status members are not perceived so positively, they may seem unlikely agents. The
appraisal literature suggests that these different interpretations of agency should have consequences for peoples expectations about others emotions. Specifically,
when the group succeeds, the high-status member will
be expected to feel pride and the low-status member will
be expected to feel appreciation.
What if the outcome is negative? Given the perceived
inadequacy of low-status people, it may be easier for
them to imagine that they did something wrong rather
than imagining the admirable high-status people making an error. Again, these agency appraisals are likely to
have consequences for expectations about emotions and
action tendencies. If low-status group members are held
responsible for negative events, then high-status people
will be expected to feel angry at them and to feel as
though they are boiling inwardly. Low-status people,
however, will be expected to feel guilty and as though
they would like to disappear from view.
Guilt and self-blame are avoided when possible, at
least in U.S. culture (Ellsworth, 1994). Thus, in negative
situations, low-status people may be expected to blame
themselves less than their superiors blame them. Yet,
even if low-status people are not expected to take total
responsibility for negative events, then the psychology of
hierarchy makes it difficult to blame high-status group
members. After all, high-status group members are seen
as superior. Thus, low-status people may compromise
and decide that no one was responsible. If that appraisal
is attributed to low-status group members, appraisal the-
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ory would predict that they would be viewed as sad
(Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). The literature on action tendencies suggests that they would also be viewed as feeling helpless.
Expectations about the emotional states that characterize social positions may affect perceptions of peoples
status. They may lead us to believe that if we know someones emotional state, we know their social position.
These expectations may also influence our interactional
styles with people at different social levels. They may lead
us to take advantage of some and to defer to others. In
short, information about others likely emotional
responses may greatly influence our perceptions, feelings, and behaviors.
Overview of Research
To examine peoples stereotypes of the emotions that
accompany social status positions, we used a vignette
methodology. In Studies 1a and 1b, we examined the
agency appraisals, agency-based emotions, and action
tendencies attributed to high- and low-status group
members. Study 1a examined negative emotions and
Study 1b examined positive emotions. In Study 2, we provided participants with information about peoples emotional responses and asked them to infer their status.
Finally, in Study 3, we examined the effects of perceptions of skill using a vignette about two characters of
equal status but unequal skill.
The same base vignettes were used in all the studies; in
each study, we predicted that high status and high skill
would be associated with anger and pride, whereas low
status and low skill would be associated with guilt, sadness, and appreciation. These expectations would be
seen, we predicted, in the agency appraisals associated
with these emotions, in the emotion ratings, and in the
action tendencies related to these emotions. Furthermore, we predicted that the expectations for appraisals
would be the weakest and the action tendencies would
be the strongest because appraisals are the least visible
component of emotion, whereas action tendencies
reflect a generally more visible component of emotion
(Frijda et al., 1989).
STUDY 1A: NEGATIVE EMOTION
ASSOCIATES OF SOCIAL STATUS

Method
PARTICIPANTS

The study consisted of 25 males and 15 females. Their
mean age was 24. The participants were recruited by two
female experimenters from a lounge in a business school
a n d w e re g i v e n c a n d y i n e x c h a n g e f o r t h e i r
participation.
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MATERIALS

Participants were given one of two versions of a vignette
about two characters (one high status and one low status)
in a business context. The first version read as follows:
Mr. Donne, the head advertising executive of Signal
Advertising Agency, and his assistant Andy have a meet
ing with a client to present an idea for advertising a new
product. Andy has the materials for the slide presenta
tion in his car and follows Mr. Donne, his supervisor, who
has the directions to the meeting. Andy and Mr. Donne
lose each other in traffic. Mr. Donne gets to the meeting
on time but cannot do the presentation because the vis
ual aids are in his assistants car. By the time Andy gets
there, the client is furious and they lose the account.

Version 2 read as follows:
Mr. Ames, the head advertising executive of Signal
Advertising Agency, and his assistant Don have a meeting
with a client to present an idea for advertising a new
product. Mr. Ames has the materials for the slide presen
tation in his car and follows Don, his assistant, who has
the directions to the meeting. Mr. Ames and Don lose
each other in traffic. Don gets to the meeting on time but
cannot do the presentation because the visual aids are in
his supervisors car. By the time Mr. Ames gets there, the
client is furious and they lose the account.

The versions differed only by which character was
matched with which status. In the first version, Character 1
(the one with the directions) was high status and Character 2 (the one with the materials) was low status; in the
second version, Character 1 (the one with the directions)
was low status and Character 2 (the one with materials)
was high status. Status was indicated by using the phrases
head advertising executive for the high-status character and assistant for the low-status character. In addition, the high-status character was referred to by the title
Mr., whereas the low-status character was referred to by
1
first name only.
After reading one of these vignettes, participants were
asked to make agency appraisals by rating how much
each of the characters held the other character responsible, held himself responsible, or held no one responsible. Then they rated how angry, sad, and guilty each
character felt. Each of these ratings was made on an 11point scale ranging from not at all to extremely. Participants also responded to action tendency questions
(Frijda et al., 1989). We asked participants to choose
between the phrases that Frijda et al. (1989) found to be
most related to the emotions of interest we are studying:
anger, sadness, and guilt. In a forced-choice format, participants were asked to mark whether boiling inwardly
(the anger action tendency), feeling helpless (the sad-

ness action tendency), or  wishing he could disappear
from view (the guilt action tendency) best described
each characters reaction.
PROCEDURE

A female experimenter approached people in a business school lounge and asked if they would be willing to
participate in a study that would take approximately 15
minutes of their time in exchange for some candy. Those
who agreed were given a questionnaire containing one
of the versions of the vignette followed by the appraisal,
emotion, and action tendency questions. The versions
were handed out in random order. Participants were
asked not to speak to anyone while doing the study.
When they were done, they handed the questionnaire
back to the experimenter and received some candy.
Results
APPRAISALS

A mixed-design MANOVA was used to examine the
patterns of the appraisal ratings of high- and low-status
characters. Participant gender and vignette version were
used as between-participant variables and the appraisal
measures were entered as within-participant measures.
This analysis indicated that neither the vignette version
nor the gender of the participants had a main effect (Fs <
1) or any interaction effects (all Fs < 1.5); therefore, the
data were collapsed over these variables. Because the
data from Versions 1 and 2 of the vignette were collapsed, in all of the following analyses, the high-status
character represents both Mr. Donne from Version 1 and
Mr. Ames from Version 2. Similarly, the data about the
low-status character represents Andy from Version 1 and
Don from Version 2. There were systematic differences
in the appraisal ratings, F(5, 195) = 18.85, p < .001. The
means for each appraisal and the results of planned
paired comparisons are presented in Table 1. The pattern of the ratings of self- and other agency appraisals fit
the predictions at varying levels of statistical significance. The high-status character was believed to blame
the low-status character more than blaming himself,
t(39) = 1.85, p < .05. In addition, the low-status character
was viewed as blaming himself significantly more than
was the high-status character, t(39) = 2.05, p < .05. The
difference between the characters in the other-agency
rating was not statistically different; however, it was in the
predicted direction, with high-status characters getting a
higher rating than low-status characters. The ratings of
the no oneagency were extremely low for both
characters.
EMOTIONS

Participants also rated the extent to which they
thought each character felt guilt, sadness, and anger.

Tiedens et al. / EMOTIONS AND STATUS
TABLE 1:
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Study 1a: Mean Agency Appraisals for High- and Low-Status Characters in Negative Outcome Vignette
High
Status

Other
Self
No one
t for column means with uncommon
letter subscripts
p < (for column means with
uncommon letter subscripts)

7.88 (2.44)a
6.55 (2.88)b
3.42 (2.55)c
1.85 (other vs. Self)

Low
Status

t for
rows

7.35 (1.97)a
7.75 (2.51)a
4.88 (2.78)b
7.43 (other vs. no one)

.05

1.14
2.05
2.66
.78 (other vs. self)

p<
(for rows)
ns
.05
.05
4.52 (other vs. no one)

.001

NOTE: Ratings were made on 11 point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 11 (extremely). Column means with uncommon letter subscripts differ;
df = 39.
TABLE 2:

Study 1a: Mean Negative Emotion Ratings From High- and Low-Status Characters
High Status

Angry
Guilty
Sad
t (for columns)
p < (for columns)

10.23 (1.51)a
6.77 (2.43)b
6.31 (3.05)b
7.16 (angry vs. Guilty)
.001

Low Status
6.64 (2.87)a
8.36 (2.78)b
8.26 (3.02)b
6.67 (angry vs. sad)
.05

t < (for rows)
7.58
2.65
3.53
2.43 (angry vs. Guilty)

p < (for rows)
.001
.05
.01
2.29 (angry vs. sad)

NOTE: Ratings were made on 11 point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 11 (extremely). Column means with uncommon letter subscripts differ;
df = 39.

Again, a mixed-design MANOVA was run. This time, the
six emotion ratings were the repeated measure variables
and version and sex were again used as betweenparticipant variables. There were no main (Fs < 1) or
interaction effects for version or sex (Fs < 1.5); therefore,
these variables were collapsed. The omnibus test indicated that there were differences in the emotion ratings,
F(5, 190) = 12.81, p < .001. The means and standard
deviations for each of the emotion ratings as well as the
results of the seven planned paired comparisons are presented in Table 2. The paired comparisons indicate
unanimous and strong support for the hypotheses. The
high-status character was rated as more angry than the
low-status character, t(39) = 7.58, p < .001, whereas the
low-status character was rated as more guilty, t(39) = 2.65,
p < .05, and more sad, t(39) = 3.53, p < .01, than the highstatus character.
ACTION TENDENCIES

Differences in action tendencies were even more pronounced than differences in emotions. Consistent with
the perception of the high-status character as angry, participants overwhelmingly believed that he would experience the action tendency for anger (i.e., boiling
inwardly), χ2(2) = 39.2, p < .0001, as opposed to the
action tendencies associated with sadness or guilt. Lowstatus characters, on the other hand, were more often
described as feeling helpless or wishing they could dis-

appear from view than boiling inwardly, χ2(2) = 10.85,
p < .005.
STUDY 1B: POSITIVE EMOTION
ASSOCIATES OF SOCIAL STATUS

Method
PARTICIPANTS

The study consisted of 22 men and 18 women who voluntarily participated. The mean age of this group of participants was 24. They were recruited by a female experimenter and were given candy for their participation.
MATERIALS

The positive vignettes followed a similar format as the
negative vignettes of Study 1a. Status was demarcated in
the same way, and again, there were two versions. The
first version read as follows:
An airline company announced that it was taking bids
from advertising agencies for a new advertising cam
paign. However, the word in the industry was that the air
line planned to continue working with the same firm
they had been using for 30 years.
When the airline met with the agency they had been
working with, they were offended because the advertis
ing firm assumed they would get the account. The airline
company executives thought that the advertising
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TABLE 3:

Study 1b: Mean Appraisal Ratings for High- and Low-Status Character in the Positive Outcome Vignette
High Status

Other
Self
No one
t (for columns)
p < (for columns)

5.67 (2.11)a
6.88 (2.38)b
2.50 (1.98)c
4.03 (other vs. Self)
.001

Low Status
6.25 (2.31)a
5.94 (2.25)a
2.58 (1.87)b
6.84 (other vs. no one)
ns (other vs. Self)

t (for rows)
1.97
3.63
.51
1.17 (other vs. Self)
.001 (other vs. no one)

p < (for rows)
.05
.01
ns
7.58 (other vs. no one)

NOTE: Ratings were made on 11 point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 11 (extremely). Column means with uncommon letter subscripts differ
at p < .05; df = 39.

representatives acted too familiarly and included details
that are not usually worked out until a bid has been
accepted.
Mr. Donne, an advertising executive, and Andy, his
assistant, work for Signal Advertising and were given the
assignment to design a campaign and present the ideas
to the airline. Mr. Donne and Andy knew that winning
the account would be very difficult so they worked hard
to come up with a plan. They did not know that the air
line was displeased with their previous advertisers when
they met with the airline executives, so they were both
nervous. Mr. Donne was so nervous that he spoke in a
rather formal fashion and Andys nerves resulted in his
forgetting to mention some of the details of their plan.
Given the airlines complaints about their previous
advertisers presentation, they were pleased that Mr.
Donne and Andy did not assume they would win the con
tract. The airline company felt as though they had been
treated with respect by Mr. Donne and Andy; thus, the
airline company accepted Mr. Donne and Andys bid.

Once again, there was another version to control for
explanations having to do with the particular behaviors
of the characters. In the second version, the low-status
person was the one who spoke too formally and the
high-status character forgot details.
As in Experiment 1a, after reading the vignettes, participants were asked to rate the appraisals and emotions
of both characters on 11-point scales. They rated how
much each character thought that the other character
was responsible, how much he thought he himself was
responsible, and how much he thought no one was
responsible. The characters were also rated for how
much pride and appreciation they felt. Because no
oneagency appraisals are not clearly associated with a
particular positive emotion, we did not include a no
oneagency positive emotion. Also, there were no action
tendency questions in this study because the action tendencies of positive emotions are not well differentiated
(Frijda et al., 1989).
PROCEDURE

As in Study 1a, a female experimenter approached
people sitting in a business school lounge and offered
candy in exchange for participating in a short study.

Those who agreed were given one of the versions of the
questionnaire. When they finished, they handed it to the
experimenter who then gave them candy.
Results
APPRAISALS

A mixed-design MANOVA was run to examine differences in appraisal ratings. The appraisal ratings were
entered as within-participant repeated measures, and
participant sex and vignette version were betweenparticipant variables. Neither sex nor vignette version
had a main effect (Fs < 1) or any interaction effects (Fs <
1.5). However, there were differences in how the participants answered the appraisal questions, F(5, 160) =
40.82, p < .001. Table 3 shows the means and standard
deviations for each appraisal question as well as the
results for the planned paired comparisons. The results
show mixed support for the hypotheses. As in Study 1a,
the general pattern exists: The low-status character was
viewed as making more other appraisals than was the
high-status character, t(39) = 1.97, p < .05, and the highstatus character was viewed as making more selfappraisals than was the low-status character, t(39) = 3.63,
p < 01. However, ratings for no oneagency appraisals for
both characters were again significantly less than the
other types of agency appraisals.
EMOTIONS

A mixed-design MANOVA was run to examine differences in the emotion attributed to the characters. Sex
and vignette version were between-participant variables,
whereas emotion ratings were within-participant variables. There were no main effects (Fs > 1) or interaction
effects (Fs < 1.5) for sex or version so the data were collapsed over these variables. There were differences in
the ratings of pride and appreciation, F(3, 117) = 4.46, p
< .01, and as Table 4 indicates, these differences were
highly supportive of our hypotheses. The low-status character was rated as feeling more appreciative than the
high-status character, t(39) = 2.44, p < .05, whereas the
high-status character was rated as feeling more proud
than the low-status character, t(39) = 2.82, p < .01.
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Study 1b: Positive Emotion Rating Means for High- and Low-Status Characters

Appreciation
Proud
t (for columns)
p < (for columns)

High Status

Low Status

7.60 (2.12)
8.60 (1.92)
3.22
.01

8.48 (1.52)
7.78 (1.93)
2.13
.05

t (for rows)
2.44
2.82

p < (for rows)
.05
.01

NOTE: Ratings were made on 11 point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 11 (extremely); df = 39.

Discussion
In these studies, our hypotheses about differences in
emotion stereotypes corresponding to status positions
were strongly supported. Our results suggest that there
are stereotypes about which emotions go with different
status roles. People expect those in low-status positions
to feel more sadness, guilt, and appreciation and highstatus group members to feel more anger and pride.
These results are strong across measures but are particularly strong for action tendencies. This may be because
the action tendencies are the measures closest to the visible manifestations of emotion.2 Similarly, in Study 1, the
hypotheses were least well supported by the appraisal
measures. Appraisals are the least visible aspect of the
emotion process and not part of lay peoples conscious,
commonsense view of emotions. Thus, expectations
about them may be the least clearly formulated. This
relative weakness of the appraisal measures is problematic, however, because it raises questions about whether
the process underlying these stereotypes was correctly
identified. That is, we claimed that differences in emotion expectations are due to differences in agency
appraisals and agency appraisal expectations. Yet,
although emotion expectation differences were found,
there was little evidence for a mediational role of agency
appraisal expectations.
The results of these studies illuminate directions for
further study. First, a replication of the basic emotion
patterns seems necessary. That was one of the purposes
of Study 2. The other purpose was to find out whether
the associations between social status positions and emotions lead people to infer status on the basis of emotions.
Such a finding would be important because it would
show that emotions can provide information about
social relationships. Another direction for further investigation is to examine the hypothesis that these patterns
are due to differences in evaluative perceptions of highand low-status people. Thus, Study 3 looks more directly
at perceptions of ability and their effects on stereotypes
of emotions.
STUDY 2: STATUS ASSOCIATES OF EMOTIONS

If social expectations about the psychological states of
people at different social levels exist, then people may

use signs of others psychological states as information
about social status. That is, once mental states are
expressed, they may serve as social markers, and if no
other status information is provided, people may be
treated as though they occupy the status level that is associated with their expressed mental state.
Studies 1a and 1b indicated that people have expectations about the probable emotional states associated
with social hierarchies. People in high positions are
expected to be proud in positive situations and angry in
negative situations. People in low positions are expected
to be appreciative in positive situations and sad and
guilty in negative situations. If status suggests probable
emotions, then emotions may signal probable status.
Knowing that someone feels guilty or appreciative may
lead people to infer that the person is low status. Similarly, learning of someones anger or pride may suggest
that the person must be high status. In this way, emotions
may convey social information and may have social consequences. High status may be attributed to an angry or
proud person. And, once a person is perceived and
treated as high status, high status has basically been
achieved. Similarly, expressing sadness or appreciation
could result in a loss of status.
In Study 2, we looked at whether information about
emotion leads to inferences about status. Participants
were presented either with a vignette in which one character was described as angry and the other was described
as sad and guilty or a vignette in which one character was
proud and the other was appreciative. Then they were
asked to indicate which character was the executive and
which character was the assistant.
Method
PARTICIPANTS

The study consisted of 71 people who served as voluntary participants. Their mean age was 39 (range = 18 to
74 years). The participants were recruited from a major
metropolitan airport by a female experimenter and were
given candy in exchange for their participation. The
experimenter approached people waiting in airport
gates; they had diverse career backgrounds. The sample
included managers, computer programmers, realtors,
restaurant workers, housewives, students, and others.
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MATERIALS

Of the participants, 37 (18 women and 19 men) read a
negative outcome vignette based on the vignette from
Study 1a and 34 (20 women and 14 men) read a positive
outcome vignette based on the vignette from Study 1b.
In both the positive and negative conditions, there were
two versions of the vignette. The first version of the negative outcome vignette read as follows:
X and Y work at Signal Advertising Agency. They have a
meeting with a client to present an idea for advertising a
new product. X has the materials for the slide presenta
tion in his car and follows Y, who has the directions, to
the meeting. X and Y lose each other in traffic. Y gets to
the meeting on time but cannot do the presentation
because the visual aids are in Xs car. By the time X gets
there, the client is furious and they lose the account. X
feels angry and Y feels sad and a little guilty.

The second negative version was the same except for
the reactions of the characters. The second version ended
with, Y feels angry and X feels sad and a little guilty.
The first version of the positive outcome vignette read
as follows:
An airline company announced that it was taking bids
from advertising agencies for a new advertising cam
paign. However, the word in the industry was that the air
line planned to continue working with the same firm
they had been using for 30 years.
When the airline met with the agency they had been
working with, they were offended because the advertis
ing firm assumed they would get the account. The airline
company executives thought that the advertising repre
sentatives acted too familiarly and included details that
are not usually worked out until a bid has been accepted.
X and Y work for Signal Advertising and were given
the assignment to design a campaign and present the
ideas to the airline company. X and Y knew that winning
the account would be very difficult and so they worked
hard to come up with a plan. They did not know that the
airline was displeased with their previous advertisers
when they met with the airline executives, so they were
both nervous. X was so nervous that he spoke in a rather
formal fashion and Ys nerves resulted in his forgetting
to mention some of the details of their plan. Given the
airlines complaints about their previous advertisers
presentation, they were pleased that X and Y did not
assume they would win the contract. The airline com
pany felt as though they had been treated with respect;
thus, the airline accepted Signals bid.
When X and Y found out the good news, X felt appre
ciative of Y and Y felt proud that the airline had signed
with Signal.

Again, there was a second version that was identical
except that Y was appreciative and X was proud.

The two versions were used so that we could be sure
that any patterns we found would be due to the emotional reactions of the characters rather than to the different behaviors of the characters. After reading one of
the vignettes, participants were asked the following two
questions: Who is the executive? and Who is the assistant? X and Y were listed after each question, and
participants were directed to circle one.
PROCEDURE

The experimenter approached people waiting in the
gates of the airport and asked whether they would be
willing to participate in a study. She explained that to
participate they would have to read a short vignette and
answer two questions about what they had read. She said
that it required approximately 5 minutes and that she
would give them candy in exchange for participation.
People who agreed to participate filled out the questionnaire and then were given their choice of candy bars.
Results
NEGATIVE OUTCOME VIGNETTE

Participants who read a negative outcome vignette
overwhelmingly believed that the character who was
described as angry was the executive and that the character described as sad and guilty was the assistant. Of the 37
participants who read a negative outcome vignette, 32
believed that the angry character was high status and the
sad/guilty character was low status, χ2(1) = 19.70, p <
.001. This pattern occurred in both versions (Version 1:
15/18 participants, χ2[1] = 8.00, p < .01; Version 2: 17/19
participants, χ2[1] = 11. 84, p < .01). Furthermore, both
men and women rated the characters in this fashion
(women: 16/18, χ2[1] = 10.89, p < .01; men: 16/19, χ2[1] =
8.89, p < .01).
POSITIVE OUTCOME VIGNETTE

The results for the positive outcome vignettes also
were strongly supportive of our predictions. The proud
character was viewed as high status and the appreciative
character was seen as low status by 26 of the 34 participants who read a positive outcome vignette, χ2(1) = 9.53,
p < .01. This pattern existed in both versions (Version 1:
13/17, χ2[1] = 4.76, p < .05; Version 2: 13/17, χ2[1] =
4.76, p < .05) and for both males (11/14, χ2[1] = 4.57, p <
.05) and females (15/20, χ2[1] = 5.00, p < .05).
Discussion
Both Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that status levels
are associated with different emotions. High status is
associated with anger and pride, whereas low status is
associated with sadness, guilt, and appreciation. Emotions are inferred from status and status is inferred from
emotions. Together, these experiments provide strong

Tiedens et al. / EMOTIONS AND STATUS
evidence for the predicted relationships between status
and expected emotions; however, neither provides
much insight into the mechanisms that underlie or create these patterns. We argued that these patterns result
from differences in the perceptions of the abilities and
skills of low- and high-status group members. The goal of
Study 3, therefore, was to test the idea that evaluative differences can create these patterns.
STUDY 3

High- and low-status people are perceived differently
on a number of dimensions, including competence,
intelligence, kindness, and attractiveness (Lambert et
al., 1960). Although high-status people are rated higher
on all these dimensions, the differences are greatest for
traits such as competence and intelligence, which imply
heightened ability (Humphrey, 1985). Thus, whereas
high-status people are considered generally superior to
low-status people, they are particularly thought to be
more able than low-status people. A recent meta-analysis
of this phenomenon concluded that this effect was
empirically well established, robust, and generalizable to
a number of social contexts (Georgesen & Harris, 1998).
If status implies ability and if the emotion patterns we
have found are caused by this inference, then any information that implies the superior ability of one person
over another should produce the same results as Studies
1a and 1b, even in the absence of status information. We
tested this hypothesis in Study 3 by modifying the original negative outcome vignette (Study 1a). We took out
the status difference by removing job titles and the use of
Mr. and by describing both characters as managers of
equal status who had worked at the company for the
same amount of time. We manipulated inferences about
ability by describing one character as having the technical skills necessary for working with this kind of client,
whereas the other character did not have the necessary
skills. We predicted that participants would see the
skilled character as likely to blame the other, to feel
angry, and to feel as though he was boiling inwardly.
They would see the inexperienced character as likely to
blame himself and no one, to feel sad and guilty, and to
feel helpless and to want to disappear from view. Because
of the consistency of the results from the positive and
negative outcome vignettes, only the negative outcome
vignette was used to examine the hypothesis that other
indicators of skill differences would result in these emotion patterns.
We compared the version of the story that described
the characters as having unequal skill with a version that
portrayed them as having equal status and skills. So far,
we have assumed that because the emotional descriptions fluctuate so easily depending on status, the story is
ambiguous; thus, when no information about status is
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given, it ought to be unclear how the characters feel. The
equal-status, equal-skill version of the story tests the
validity of this assumption.
Method
PARTICIPANTS

The study consisted of 25 men and 17 women who
served as voluntary participants. Their mean age was 23.
Again, they were recruited by a female experimenter
from a business school lounge and were given candy in
exchange for their participation.
MATERIALS

In this study, there were two versions of the negative
outcome vignette adapted from Study 1a. In the experimental version, the characters were described as equal
status but one character (the one who had the directions) was described as having more of the technical
skills necessary to work with the client than the other
character (the one with the visual materials). This
vignette read as follows:
Don and Andy are coworkers at Signal Advertising
Agency. They have been working at Signal for roughly
the same amount of time and are at the same level.
Today, they have a meeting with a client to present an
idea for advertising a new product. Don has the techni
cal knowledge that is particularly important for working
with this client. Although Andy has worked on as many
and as big accounts as has Don, he does not have the
technical skills relevant to this particular account.
When they go to the meeting, Andy has the materials
for the slide presentation in his car and he follows Don,
who has the directions, to the meeting. Andy and Don
lose each other in traffic. Don arrives at the meeting on
time but he cannot do the presentation because the vis
ual aids are in Andys car. By the time Andy arrives, the
client is furious and they lose the account.

Because Experiments 1a and 2a indicated that the
behaviors of the characters did not affect any of the
dependent variables, we did not include a condition in
which the character with the visual materials had more
skills than the one with directions. However, a control
version was included. This version was the same except
the two sentences about skills were left out. In both the
skill differential questionnaire and the equal status/
equal skill questionnaire, agency appraisals, negative
emotions, and action tendencies were assessed for both
characters using the same wordings as in Study 1a.
PROCEDURE

The procedure used in previous experiments was also
used in this experiment.
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TABLE 5:

Study 3: Mean Appraisal Ratings for Skill Differentiated (Experimental) and Equal Status/Skill (Control) Conditions
Skill Differentiated (Experimental) Condition

High
Skill Don
Other
Self
No one
t (for column
comparisons)
df
p < (for column
comparisons)

Low
Skill Andy

Equal Status/Skill (Control) Condition
p < (for
comparisons
between high
skill Don and
low skill Andy)

1
6.23 (2.14)a1
7.41 (2.50)a
1
7.00 (2.41)a1
5.41 (2.15)b
1
4.73 (2.57)b1
3.77 (2.49)c
2.15 (other vs. Self)
.92 (other vs. Self)
5.14 (other vs. no one)
2.23 (other vs. no one)
21
21
.05 (other vs. Self)
ns (other vs. self)
.001 (other vs. no one) .05 (other vs. no one)

ns
.05
.05

Equal Don
6.80 (3.00)a1
5.85 (2.72)a1
5.95 (3.65)a1
.83 (other vs. Self)
.85 (other vs. no one)
19
ns

Equal Andy

p < (for
comparisons
between equal
Andy and
equal Don)

7.40 (2.72)a1
ns
6.15 (3.03)a, b1
ns
5.10 (3.13)b1
ns
1.26 (other vs. self)
2.25 (other vs. no one)
19
ns (other vs. self)
.05 (other vs. no one)

NOTE: Ratings were made on 11 point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 11 (extremely). Column means with uncommon letter subscripts differ.
Number superscripts represent comparison tests between the experimental Don with the control Don and the experimental Andy and control
Andy. Means with uncommon numbers differ significantly.

Results
APPRAISALS

A mixed-design MANOVA was run to examine differences in the appraisal ratings. The appraisals were
within-participant measures, and sex and vignette version (i.e., skill differentiated or equal) were betweenparticipant variables. There was no main effect for sex,
F(1, 38) = .01, ns, and there were not any interactions
involving sex (Fs < 1.5). There was also no main effect for
vignette version, F(1, 38) = 1.96, p = .17. The interaction
between vignette version and appraisal ratings was marginally significant, F(5, 190) = 1.98, p = .08. The mean
appraisal ratings for both characters in both conditions
are presented in Table 5.
In the skill differential condition, the means were in
the predicted pattern; however, the significance levels of
some of the planned contrasts indicated that these differences could be due to chance. Participants believed
that Don, the highly skilled character, would blame Andy
(M = 7.41, SD = 2.50), the character without skill, more
than Andy would blame Don, but this difference did not
reach significance (M = 6.23, SD = 2.14), t(21) = 1.57, p <
.15. Andy was also rated as significantly more selfblaming (M = 7.00, SD = 2.41) than Don (M = 5.41, SD =
2.15), t(21) = 2.28, p < .05, and more likely to make
more situational appraisals (Andy: M = 4.73, SD = 2.57;
Don: M = 3.77, SD = 2.49), t(21) = 2.00, p < .05.
The within-character comparisons also provided
mixed support. The highly skilled Don blamed his partner more than he blamed himself, t(21) = 2.15, p < .05, or
no one, t(21) = 5.14, p < .001. However, the self- and
other appraisals attributed to Andy did not differ, and
the no oneagency appraisal ratings for Andy were less
than both other and self-appraisals for Andy.

In the condition in which the characters were not distinguished by skill or status there were, as predicted, no
differences between the ratings of the two characters.
The only reliable within-character comparison was the
rating of Andys blaming Don (M = 7.40, SD = 2.72) to the
rating of Andys blaming no one (M = 5.10, SD = 3.13),
t(19) = 2.25, p < .05. Although this difference was not
found for the equal Don, it is consistent with the results
for almost all of the characters of very low no oneagency
ratings in this study and in Study 1.
There were no reliable differences in perceptions of
the highly skilled Don of the experimental condition
and the equally skilled Don of the control condition or
between the low-skilled Andy of the experimental condition and the equally skilled Andy of the control
condition.
EMOTIONS

A mixed-design MANOVA with sex and vignette version as between-participant variables and the emotion
ratings as within-participant variables indicated that neither sex nor version had a main effect on emotion ratings (Fs < 2, ps > .15). There also were no interaction
effects involving sex (Fs < 1.5). As expected, there was a
main effect for emotion ratings, F(5, 190) = 4.62, p < .01,
and an interaction between vignette version and emotion ratings, F(5, 190) = 4.41, p < .01. The mean emotion
ratings for each character in each vignette are presented
in Table 6. They provide strong support for the
hypotheses.
In the skill-differentiated version, the highly skilled
Don was seen as angrier (M = 9.23, SD = 2.18) than the
low-skilled Andy (M = 6.00, SD = 2.60), t(21) = 4.88, p <
.001, whereas Andy was seen as more sad (M = 8.00, SD =
2.94) than Don (M = 6.00, SD = 3.37), t(21) = 2.27, p < .05,
and more guilty (M = 7.86, SD = 2.36) than Don (M =
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Study 3: Mean Emotion Ratings for Skill Differentiated (Experimental) and Equal Status/Skill (Control) Conditions
Skill Differentiated (Experimental) Condition

High
Skill Don

Low
Skill Andy
1

Anger
9.23 (2.18)a
1
Guilt
5.68 (3.01)b
1
Sadness
6.00 (3.37)b
t for column
3.86 (anger vs. Guilt)
comparisons
3.23 (anger vs. sadness)
df
21
p < (for column
.01
means with
uncommon
letter subscripts)

6.00 (2.60)a1
7.86 (2.36)b1
8.00 (2.94)b1
2.15 (anger vs. Guilt)
2.08 (anger vs. sadness)
21
.05

Equal Status/Skill (Control) Condition
p < (for
comparisons
between high
skill Don and
low skill Andy)
.001
.05
.05

Equal Don

Equal Andy

p < (for
comparisons
between equal
Andy and
equal Don)

7.95 (3.22)a1
8.20 (2.17)a2
ns
6.20 (3.17)b1
6.25 (3.86)b2
ns
5.50 (3.79)b1
5.85 (3.01)b1
ns
1.76 (anger vs. Guilt)
2.09 (anger vs. guilt)
2.52 (anger vs. sadness) 3.11 (anger vs. sadness)
19
19
.10 (anger vs. Guilt)
.05
.05 (anger vs. sadness)

NOTE: Ratings were made on 11 point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 11 (extremely). Column means with uncommon letter subscripts differ.
Number superscripts represent comparison tests between the experimental Don with the control Don and the experimental Andy and control
Andy. Means with uncommon numbers differ reliably (p < .05).

5.68, SD = 3.01), t(21) = 2.80, p < .05. The withincharacter comparisons between guilt and sadness were
not reliable for either character, and both guilt and sadness differed from anger ratings for both characters.
There were no differences between the ratings of the
two characters in the condition in which the characters
had equal status and skills. Within-character comparisons indicated tendencies toward rating both characters
higher in anger than in sadness (Don: t[19] = 2.52, p <
.05; Andy: t[19] = 2.09, p < .10).
Comparisons between the skilled Don and the equal
Don did not reveal any reliable differences; however,
there were differences between the unskilled Andy and
the equal Andy. When Andy was described as a partner
equal in status and skills, he was considered more angry
(M = 8.20, SD = 2.17) than when he was a low-skill partner
(M = 6.00, SD = 2.60), t(40) = 2.96, p < .01. The equal
status/skill Andy was also considered less guilty than the
low-skill Andy (control: M = 5.85, SD = 3.01; experimental: M = 7.86, SD = 2.35), t(40) = 2.42, p < .05. The sadness
ratings were not significantly different.
ACTION TENDENCIES

The action tendency ratings for the two characters in
the skill differential condition were as predicted. Fifteen
participants indicated that Don (the high-skilled character) would feel as though he was boiling inwardly (the
anger action tendency), whereas 6 chose the sad option
feeling helpless and 1 chose wishing to disappear
from view (the guilt action tendency). This tendency to
assign Don to boiling inwardly rather than the other two
options was reliable, χ2(2) = 13.73, p < .01. Participants
chose different action tendencies to describe Andy. Ten
of them chose wishing to disappear from view, 10 of

chose feeling helpless, and 2 chose boiling inwardly,
χ2(2) = 5.82, p < .10.
In the equal-status, nondifferentiated, skill condition,
Don and Andy were assigned the exact same patterns of
action tendencies. In both cases, 10 participants thought
the characters would be boiling inwardly, 9 thought the
characters would be feeling helpless, and 1 thought they
would be wishing to disappear from view, χ2(2) = 7.30, p <
.05.
Discussion
The results from Study 3 show that explicit manipulations of perceptions of skill produced the same basic patterns as manipulations of status levels in Study 1a. Highly
skilled characters were seen in the same way as highstatus characters; they were expected to feel angry and
boil inwardly. Low-skill characters were perceived similar
to low-status characters; they were expected to feel sad,
guilty, and helpless and to wish they could disappear
from view. That skill differences created the same patterns as status differences lends support to the hypothesis that peoples inferences about the skills of high- and
low-status group members are involved in their statusemotion stereotypes.
The existence of the same appraisal pattern across
studies supports the appraisal approach to this problem,
but again, the appraisal data were substantially weaker
than the data for emotions and action tendencies. Not
only were some of the differences we expected nonsignificant but the ratings of the no oneagency appraisals
were consistently far lower than the other appraisals for
all characters. This pattern may be due to peoples desire
to establish some cause for important events (Heider,
1944; Kelley, 1967; Weiner, 1986), but whatever its root,
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these extremely low ratings may have overshadowed the
more subtle differences between the self- and other
agency ratings. The appraisal ratings may also have been
less confirmatory than the other variables because emotions and action tendencies are more visible than attributions. It may be that the stereotypes we have uncovered are based on peoples obser vations of the
expressions and behaviors of people in low- and highstatus roles. These feelings and expressions might be
rooted in appraisals but perhaps the stereotypes of them
do not rely on such a complex process.
Study 3 also provided insight into the effects of status
on perceived emotion by including a baseline condition.
In this condition, in which participants were not provided with information on skill level, participants rated
both characters emotions and action tendencies
ambiguously but most similarly to the way they rated
high-status and high-skill characters. This result suggests
that high status is construed as the norm and that our
most significant stereotypes may be reserved for lowstatus people. Perhaps the general findings and theories
about attributions and emotions really best describe people who are, or think of themselves as, high status.
GENERAL DISCUSSION

In these studies, we found, as expected, that high-status
people were perceived as getting angry when things go
wrong and low-status people were perceived as feeling
sadness and guilt. When things turn out well, high-status
group members are expected to feel pride and low-status
people are expected to feel appreciation. We argued that
these effects occur because peoples assumptions about
the skills and abilities associated with status lead them to
expect low-status people to be more responsible for
negative outcomes than are high-status people, although
high-status people are expected to be more responsible
for positive events than are low-status people.
These results add depth to the study of stereotypes,
the study of emotions, and the study of social hierarchy.
Most research describes stereotypes as dispositional
traits associated with certain groups. By identifying
stereotypes about emotions, we have raised the possibility that people also hold stereotypes about complex
internal psychological processes. That is, we may not
only make inferences about dispositions and behavior
from knowledge of social categories but we may also
believe that we know how people think and feel.
That the stereotypes we studied were about emotions
serves as a reminder of the social importance of emotions. Emotion researchers, after decades of attention to
the internal processes involved in emotions, have begun
to consider questions about the social causes and consequences of emotions (Fridlund, 1994; Kappas, 1996;

Keltner et al., 1998; Parkinson, 1995), but our knowledge is still sparse. In this research, we have
demonstrated that the perceived characteristics of social
roles can tell us something about social expectations
about emotions.
Social expectations about emotions are interesting, in
part, because they may help us understand the social
functions of emotions. One function implied in this
research is that status-linked emotions may help to stabilize social hierarchies. Although disruptions in hierarchies occur, in general, hierarchies are marked by stability (Brown, 1985; Mazur, 1973). Emotions may maintain
hierarchies in a variety of ways, three of which are suggested by these studies. First, emotional responses
appear to have a circular relationship with hierarchical
position. Experiment 1 indicated that high status implies
anger and pride, and Experiment 2 indicated that anger
and pride imply high status. The emotions permitted by
status position may, in turn, imply social position, resulting in responses that reify and justify the status quo.
Second, the particular emotions associated with high
and low status may have a maintenance function. Expectations of anger and pride from high-status people may
lead to expectations of aggressive and coercive behavior
and inhibit low-status people from challenging or questioning their superiors. Expectations of guilt, sadness,
and appreciation from low-status people may reduce the
likelihood that high-power people will feel obligated to
explain or justify themselves and make abuse of power
less costly.
Third, the existence of these expectations might create the occurrence of actual emotional responses in line
with the expectations. These actual emotional responses
would then, of course, reinforce the expectations. Thus,
emotional expectations could create a self-fulfilling
prophecy that ultimately places limitations on the social
mobility of low-status group members.
Emotion stereotypes based on social status may also
help explain situations in which hierarchical positions
are questioned and challenged. When people violate
emotion expectations, they might change perceptions
about what level is most appropriate for them and/or
make disruptive behaviors more likely. For example, a
low-status person expressing pride, rather than appreciation, might communicate that she or he is highly competent and ought to be high status. Through such
expressions, she or he might accrue status and power.
Similarly, a high-status group member who expresses
guilt and sadness, rather than anger, might appear particularly weak and may be willing to hand over power and
status to others who may also interpret the guilt and sadness as an opportunity to attain more status for
themselves.

Tiedens et al. / EMOTIONS AND STATUS
FUTURE DIRECTIONS

To fully understand the implications of emotion
stereotypes of social status positions, it is necessary to
study actual emotional reactions in social hierarchies.
We have begun such an investigation (Tiedens et al.,
1998) and our results suggest that the emotion stereotypes described in the present research are accurate. The
expectations do indeed seem to reflect peoples experience. Still, it is necessary to study the interplay between
actual emotions in hierarchies and stereotypes about
emotions in hierarchies. We not only need to know
whether these stereotypes are accurate but also whether
they affect peoples own emotional responses and their
responses to the emotional displays of others.
We also plan to extend this investigation to hierarchies outside of work settings and to explore other
appraisals and emotions that may be affected by social
status. Although there is much that is common across
hierarchies, they do differ, and our focus on business settings probably has not allowed us to uncover all the
dynamics of status-emotion stereotypes. For example,
business settings tend to be male oriented, and the characters in the vignettes were male. Although we did not
find any evidence of differences based on the respondents gender, we might have if there were female targets
or if other forms of social hierarchies were examined. By
simplifying our studies and excluding female targets, we
may have missed an important and interesting element
of stereotypes about status and emotions (cf. Timmers,
Fischer, & Manstead, 1998). On the other hand, the similarity of the ratings of men and women may not be artifactual. Some researchers have suggested that gender
differences are primarily due to differences in the social
status and social roles of women and men (Eagly, 1987;
Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Ridgeway & Diekema, 1989). It
may be that because our studies varied role status explicitly, gender was less important, as Eaglys (1987) social
role theory would predict. Certainly, understanding the
relationships between gender, emotion, and status is
important given the similarity between the stereotypes
uncovered here and those held about the different emotions of men and women, but it may be that peoples
stereotypes about the emotions of men and women are
due to their stereotypes about low- and high-status people more generally.
Although the focus here was on agency appraisals, it is
unlikely that this is the only dimension of appraisal relevant to social hierarchy and emotion. For example, certainty is another dimension of appraisal that has been
shown to be important in discriminating among emotions (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) and along which there
may well be systematic variation between high- and lowstatus group members. High-status people likely experience more certainty due to their higher degrees of con-
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trol, whereas low-status people likely experience more
uncertainty due to their dependence on high-status people (Fiske & Depret, 1996). Differences along this
dimension of appraisal would imply differences in the
frequency and intensity of emotions such as fear and
anxiety.
In addition, appraisal need not be the only avenue to
differences in emotions between people of different
status levels. Rather, there may also be differences in
expression and physiological functioning. Indeed, the
mixed support provided by the appraisal data suggests
that further examination of these other processes could
be useful in fully understanding why these emotionstatus patterns exist.
Nonetheless, we believe that the data presented here
indicate that our knowledge about the internal
processes involved in emotions can be used to understand how emotions are related to social contexts. People have expectations about emotions based on social
roles, and people make inferences about social roles
based on emotions. By demonstrating these processes,
these studies represent an important first step to understanding the complex relationship between emotions
and the social world.
NOTES
1. By using these manipulations, we do not intend to imply that
status can always be reduced to simply a title. Indeed, status is complex
both in its causes and in its appearance. The complexity inherent in the
definition of status and thus in its empirical realization is probably one
reason that so little research on this topic has been completed. Using a
simple manipulation, we believe, is one way to allow for the empirical
investigation of such a tricky concept, but clearly, replications using
other indicators of status would enhance the study of social hierarchy.
2. However, the action tendency questions were not in the same for
mat as the other questions. They were forced choice rather than rat
ings. The action tendency question may have revealed greater differ
ences due to this format. At the same time, forced choice can obscure
differences rather than enhance them.
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